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DIPLOMA DENIAL MEETS REMEDY DENIAL IN
CALIFORNIA: TACKLING THE ISSUE OF
REMEDIES IN EXIT EXAM LITIGATION AFTER
THE VACATED VALENZUELA V. O'CONNELL
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Arturo J. Gonzilez* & Johanna Hartwig**

I.

INTRODUCTION 1

In contemporary American society, a high school diploma
is not just key to success, but key to survival. Individuals
who do not have high school diplomas are not eligible for a
whole range of low-paying jobs, let alone jobs that pay
decently, and are much more likely to be unemployed.2 A
person cannot even join the U.S. Army without a high school
diploma or a G.E.D.3 Moreover, Americans who do not have
high school diplomas face significantly higher health and

Chair of Trial Practice Group, Morrison & Foerster LLP; B.A., University of
California at Davis; J.D., Harvard Law School.
"" Associate Attorney, Morrison & Foerster LLP; B.A., Yale University; J.D.,
University of Michigan Law School; M.P.P., University of Michigan Ford School
of Public Policy; Teach For America Alumna 1997. I would like to dedicate this
Article to my parents, who made sure the doors of educational opportunity were
always open for me.
1. The information provided herein may not be applicable in all situations
and should not be acted upon without specific legal advice based on particular
situations. The views expressed in this Article are those of the Authors only,
are intended to be general in nature, and are not attributable to Morrison &
Foerster LLP or any of its clients.
2. NAOMI CHUDOWSKY ET AL., CTR. ON EDUC. POL'Y, STATE HIGH SCHOOL
EXIT EXAMS: A BASELINE REPORT 26 (2002); Declaration of Norton Grubb in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at %%5-15, Valenzuela
v. O'Connell, No. CPF-06506050 (Super. Ct of Cal., County of San Francisco,
Mar. 23, 2006). Note that the case was transferred to the Alameda County
Superior Court after the filing of the initial preliminary injunction papers.
3. See
Army.com,
Enlist:
Requirements,
http://www.army.com/enlist/requirements.html (last visited May 10, 2007).
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welfare risks throughout the rest of their lives.4
While the tangible value of a high school diploma has
soared, states across the country have raised the bar for
graduation
by introducing high school exit exam
requirements. 5 Fifteen years ago, only a handful of states
had exit exams. Now, twenty-five states have exit exams or
are in the process of introducing them.6 By 2012, about seven
in ten public school students, including about eight in ten
minority public school students, will be required to pass an
exit exam in order to graduate high school in the United
States.7
The rise in high school exit exams has paralleled the
most significant trend in education policy over the last fifteen
years, standards-based reform.
In 1983, educators and
policymakers across the country were alarmed by a
presidential blue-ribbon commission report called "A Nation
at Risk."9 The report declared that the nation was threatened
4. Declaration of Pedro Noguera in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at
16-21, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. CPF-06506050
(Super. Ct of Cal., County of San Francisco, Mar. 23, 2006); Declaration of
Michelle Fine in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
31-37, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. CPF-06506050 (Super. Ct of Cal., County of
San Francisco, Mar. 23, 2006).
5. For detailed and well-supported research on high school exit exams
nationwide, consult the annual series of reports issued by the independent
Center on Education Policy. See, e.g., NANCY KOBER ET AL., CTR. ON EDUC.
POL'Y, STATE HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMS: A CHALLENGING YEAR (2006);
PATRICIA SULLIVAN ET AL., CTR. ON EDUC. POL'Y, STATE HIGH SCHOOL EXIT
EXAMS: STATES TRY HARDER, BUT GAPS PERSIST (2005); KEITH GAYLER ET AL.,
CTR. ON EDUC. POL'Y, STATE HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMS: A MATURING REFORM
(2004) [hereinafter GAYLER 2004]; KEITH GAYLER ET AL., CTR.ON EDUC. POLY,
STATE HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMS: PUT TO THE TEST (2003) [hereinafter GAYLER
2003]; CHUDOWSKY ET AL., supra note 2.
6. See KOBER ET AL., supra note 5, at 11-13. For a description of the

typical features of exit exam systems nationwide, see CHUDOWSKY ET AL., supra
note 2, at 45-52. For a detailed chart of exit exam features according to state,
see KOBER ET AL., supra note 5, at 7-10. For a description of the history of high
school exit exams and their rise, as well as a description of exit exam legislation
in different states, see Jennifer R. Rowe, High School Exit Exams Meet IDEAAn Examination of the History, Legal Ramifications, and Implications for Local
School Administratorsand Teachers, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 75, 88-118 (2004).
7. See KOBERETAL., supra note 5, at 11.
8. CHUDOWSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 23-29. For a helpful description of

what standards-based reform is and what it targets, along with an account of its
development, see John F. Jennings, School Reform Based on What is Taught
and Learned, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, June 1995, at 765.
9. NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUC., A NATION AT RISK (U.S. Gov't

Printing Office 1983).
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by "a rising tide of mediocrity" and called for greater
investment in education and the implementation of stronger
academic expectations.1" The increasingly popular answer to
the challenge posed by "A Nation at Risk" has been to develop
statewide academic content standards and to integrate those
standards into the curricula. The standards-based trend has
allowed states to increase the consistency of instruction
across their schools." One important goal of the standards
movement has been to improve educational outcomes for
children whose performance had traditionally been ignored,
namely, poor and minority students.12
The skyrocketing popularity of exit exams has paralleled
the standards movement as a way to measure and enforce
achievement goals. 3 Yet states have neither improved their
public schools at the same rate they have taken up exit
exams, nor directed new resources to schools for student
preparation with the same enthusiasm that they have
trumpeted the "get tough" exit exam requirements." While

10. Id. at 5. The report's judgment on the state of American education was
harsh:
If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the
mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well
have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands, we have allowed this to
happen to ourselves. We have even squandered the gains in student
achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge. Moreover, we
have dismantled essential support systems which helped make those
gains possible.
We have, in effect, been committing an act of
unthinking, unilateral educational disarmament.
Id.
11. See generallyJennings, supra note 8.
12. This goal is captured, for example, in the Adequate Yearly Progress
measurements of the standards-based reform-inspired legislation, No Child Left
Behind (although not all supporters of standards-based reform support NCLB),
which requires that states and schools achieve performance goals for subsets of
traditionally underserved students. See MARGARET E. GOERTZ, CTR. ON EDUC.
POLVY, The Federal Role in an Era of Standards-BasedReform, in THE FUTURE
OF THE FEDERAL ROLE IN ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION, at 51-59

(2001),
available
at
http://www.cepdc.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=497&parentID=481.
13. See CHUDOWSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 27-29, for a description of the
goals of standards-based reform and how exit exams relate. Note also that,
while this Article does not address the issue, the impact of high school exit
exams on improving student outcomes is still in question. See KOBER ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 49-70.
14. For thoughtful data and analysis regarding the challenges states have
faced in ensuring that students receive a fair opportunity to learn the material
tested on their new exit exams, see CH-UDOWSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 56-59;
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support for the standards movement has been generally
strong, the concomitant rush to high-stakes testing has
sparked fierce debate. A key concern is that, although many
states have successfully instituted standards, most states still
face struggling education systems in which a significant
number of students-particularly
poor and minority
students-are provided inferior and ineffective schooling.15
Although exit exams have in general been politically
popular, this disjunction between stiffer graduation
requirements and the still slack quality of schooling has
inspired opposition, including through the courts. In the last
few years, Massachusetts, Alaska, and Arizona have seen
their exit exams challenged in court, and other states, such as
Washington, have faced opposition through pressure on the
legislature and state boards of education. 6 This Article
focuses on one recent exit exam litigation, Valenzuela v.
O'Connell, which claims that the California High School Exit
Exam (CAHSEE) cannot legally be imposed as a graduation
requirement given the current facts of K-12 public education
in California. 1 7 The Valenzuela plaintiffs met initial success,
securing a preliminary injunction against the CAHSEE
diploma penalty in the spring of 2006, but then saw their
victory overturned by the California Court of Appeal. A key
reason the Appellate Court vacated the injunction was its
determination that the remedy of allowing students to
graduate was impermissible, and that the only appropriate
remedies would have focused on further educational
opportunities.
This Article will focus on the issue of remedies in the
context of Valenzuela as the question of remedies is likely to
play a central role in future high school exit exam litigation."
GAYLER 2003, supra note 5, at 71-78; GAYLER 2004, supra note 5, at 79-98;
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 45-58.
15. See, e.g., CHUDOWSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 59; GAYLER 2004, supra

note 5, at 82.
16. See KOBERETAL., supra note 5, at 19-27.
17. Coordinated Judicial Proceeding, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. JCCP4468, (Super. Ct of Cal., County of Alameda, May 12, 2006).
18. Note that a number of lawsuits have focused particularly on students
with disabilities. See, e.g., Rene v. Reed, 751 N.E.2d 736 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Academic analysis of the legal implications of high-stakes testing of students
with disabilities has been substantial. See, e.g., James M. Baron, Note, When
Good Intentions Go Bad: The MCAS Requirement and Special Education
Children, 40 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 123 (2006); Paul T. O'Neill, Special Education
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Part II will provide a brief background on the CAHSEE
system. Part III will identify the key exit exam cases and
how they treated the issue of remedies, and Part IV will
summarize the Valenzuela case. Part V will examine the
Valenzuela rulings, especially the ruling from the Appellate
Court. This Part will explore the Appellate Court's faulty
and
powers
of
regarding
separation
reasoning
appropriateness of the remedy. It will also discuss the
Appellate Court's failure to consider the plaintiffs' solid due
process claim. Part VI will then take the opportunity to
briefly propose and assess some alternative strategic choices
the Valenzuela plaintiffs could have made.
II. THE INTRODUCTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CALIFORNIA HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAM

In 1999, California joined the growing number of states
instituting high school exit exams.' 9 Introduction of the
California High School Exit Exam was initiated by thenGovernor Gray Davis and then-State Senator, and current
Superintendent of Public Instruction (SPI), Jack O'Connell.2 °
The CAHSEE followed legislation requiring development and
implementation of "statewide academically rigorous content
standards" (Standards) by 1998.21 While the State cannot
mandate curricula, it has tied funding streams for textbooks
to curricula aligned with the Standards, and districts
therefore have gradually aligned their local curricula to the
Standards.22 The CAHSEE has two parts, English Language
Arts (ELA) and Mathematics, and is based on the

and High Stakes Testing for High School Graduation:An Analysis of Current
Law and Policy, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 185 (2001). This Article will not address the
distinct legal issues that arise in exit exam litigation brought by plaintiff
students with disabilities.
19. Dan Smith, Class of 2004 Must Pass Test: Davis Signs 2 School Reform
Bills, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 30, 1999, at Al.
20. Id.; see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850 et seq. (West 2007). For an early
description of the background and structure of the CAHSEE legislation, see
Mary Nebgen, California'sHigh School Exit Examination: Passing the Test, 31
MCGEORGE L. REV. 359,360-364 (2000).
21. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60605.
22. See EdSource's "Standards and Curriculum Overview" for a description
of California's adoption of content standards and how the state Standards
at
available
of
local
curricula,
adoption
influence
http://www.edsource.orgledu_sta.cfm.
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Standards.23 The ELA section tests Standards that are
supposed to be covered by the end of tenth grade English
instruction; the Math section tests Standards that should be
covered by the end of instruction in algebra (usually offered in
the eighth or ninth grade).2 4 Students first take the CAHSEE
in the tenth grade, and are given multiple opportunities
during the following years to take it again.25 No students are
exempted from passing the exam in order to receive a
diploma.26 However, the State Board of Education, consulting
with the Superintendent of Public Instruction, was by statute
supposed to study and decide whether an appropriate
alternative assessment should be added for those students
who had demonstrated in other ways that they had gained
proficiency in the Standards.27
The CAHSEE was intended to be part of a new
accountability system in California schools introduced in the
late 1990s designed to spur academic improvement across the
state. 28

The CAHSEE policy, however, only includes one

accountability tool, the diploma penalty. It therefore only
holds to account one participant in California's school system,
the students.29 It introduces no penalty for school districts,
schools or teachers based on their students' performance on

23. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(a).

24. See California Department of Education CAHSEE Program Overview,
[hereinafter CAHSEE Program
http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/tg/hs/overview.asp
Overview].
25. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60851(b).
26. Id. §§ 60851-60852. Special education students, however, have been
granted temporary exemptions based on interim settlements of an ongoing
lawsuit. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text
27. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60856.
28. The California Department of Education website states:
The primary purpose of the California High School Exit Examination
(CAHSEE) is to significantly improve pupil achievement in public high
schools and to ensure that pupils who graduate from public high
schools can demonstrate grade level competency in reading, writing,
and mathematics. The CAHSEE helps identify students who are not
developing skills that are essential for life after high school and
encourages districts to give these students the attention and resources
needed to help them achieve these skills during their high school years.
See also EdSource's
CAHSEE Program Overview, supra note 24.
"Accountability Overview" for a description of the new educational
accountability system California began to introduce in the late 1990s, including
the CAHSEE, available at http://www.edsource.orgedu-acc.cfm.
29. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 60850-60856.
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the exam. While the State" hired independent evaluators to
annually study CAHSEE implementation generally, the
CAHSEE program does not include any monitoring
mechanism for implementation of the exit exam by individual
districts, except in that CAHSEE scores are included in the
State's overall rating system for schools. 1 There is no
mechanism by which teachers are evaluated according to
The exit exam
their students' CAHSEE performance.
program also creates no accountability measures for any
state-level entity.
The CAHSEE system sharply contrasts with some other
For example, under the
school accountability reforms. 2
federal No Child Left Behind system, schools and school
districts face an array of consequences dependent on student
performance, including allowing students to transfer schools
and disbanding school staffs.3 3 States are subject to strict
monitoring and reporting requirements, and may find their
funding docked for non-compliance. Students themselves,
however, are not penalized. Furthermore, other state high
school exit exam systems, such as that in Texas, also include
accountability measures for districts, schools, and teachers. 4
In addition to introducing no mechanisms to monitor and
improve district performance, the State also offered districts
negligible support to implement this burdensome new testing
and test preparation regime, even though nationwide
evidence shows that such costs to districts are substantial. 5
The State pays for the development of the test and for its
administrations.3 6 The most significant costs, however, are
typically those related to student preparation for the test and

30. For purposes of this Article, "State" is used to generally mean state-level
entities and officials, particularly the Legislature, the California Department of
Education, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the State Board of
Education.
31. See CAHSEE Program Overview, supra note 24.
32. Paul T. O'Neill contrasts high-stakes testing systems that hold
individual students accountable to those that hold teachers, schools, and
See Paul T. O'Neill, High Stakes Testing Law and
districts accountable.
Litigation, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 623, 624-25 (2003).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2002).
34. GI Forum v. Texas Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 674 (W.D. Tex.

2000).
35.

KEITH GAYLER ET AL., CTR. ON EDUC. POLY, PAY Now OR PAY LATER:

THE HIDDEN COSTS OF HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAMS 5-8 (2004).
36. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60851(a)
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remediation, and the CAHSEE system left districts to pay for
those costs out of their regularly available funds or general
remedial funds.37 Although the legislation mandated that
students who fail a section of the CAHSEE be immediately
provided remediation, the State allocated no funding for it,
and in fact, the statute specifically denies districts' ability to
request funding for CAHSEE remediation as an unfunded
mandate.3"
The State finally provided some funding for
CAHSEE remediation in the fall of 2005, four years after the
test was first administered, and not long before the first class
subject to the diploma penalty would graduate.3 9 But at that
point, the Legislature allocated just twenty million dollars,
which was only enough money to provide funds to schools
that had more than a twenty-eight percent failure rate.4"
California first administered its exit exam in 2001.41 The
initial students subject to the diploma penalty, however, were
not scheduled to graduate until 2004.42 But by the summer of
2002, less than half of the Class of 2004 had passed,43 and in
May 2003, a study commissioned according to statute by the
State Board of Education (Board), and performed by their
independent contractor, the Human Resources Research
Organization (HumRRO), reported that students in the Class
of 2004 were not adequately prepared to pass the exam."
The Board then voted unanimously to delay the diploma
penalty for two years, until 2006. 4 ' Four of the nine Board

37. See GAYLER 2004, supra note 5, at 5-8; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60853 (a).
38. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60851(f) (West 2007).
39. Declaration of Arturo J. Gonzdlez in Support of Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at T 37, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. CPF-06506050 (Super. Ct of
Cal., County of San Francisco, Mar. 23, 2006). [hereinafter Gonzdlez
Declaration].
40. Id.
41. CAHSEE Program Overview, supra note 24.
42. LAURESS L. WISE ET AL., HuM. RES. RESEARCH ORG. [HuMRRO],
HIGH SCHooL EXIT EXAM
(CAHSEE): AB 1609 STUDY REPORT-VOLUME 1, at i (2003), available at
INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE CALIFORNIA

http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/tg/hs/documents/abl609srvlall.pdf

[hereinafter

HUMRRO 2003 REPORT].
43. LAuREss L. WISE ET AL., HuMRRO, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE
CALIFORNIA HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAM (CAHSEE): YEAR THREE EVALUATION
available
at
46
(2002),
REPORT

http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/tg/hs/documents/y3exesum.pdf.
44. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60855 (West 2007); HumRRO 2003 REPORT, supra
note 42, at i-v.
45. See Minutes of July 9, 2003, Meeting of the California State Board of
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members supported delaying the penalty until 2007.46
Latino, African American, English Language Learner,
and low-income students have consistently failed the
CAHSEE at significantly higher rates than their white, Asian
American, non-English Language Learner, or middle/high
income peers.4 7 For example, by the end of the eleventh
grade, only sixty-three percent of African American students,
sixty-eight percent of Latino students, and fifty-one percent of
English Language Learner students in the Class of 2006 were
estimated to have passed the CAHSEE, compared to ninety
percent of white students and eighty-nine percent of Asian
American students.48
The disparity in passage rates is foreseeable and
unsurprising given the overrepresentation of poor and
minority students in California's worst schools.
Earlier
litigation highlighted the basis for this rift. In 2000, the
ACLU, Morrison & Foerster LLP (the same law firm
representing students in Valenzuela), and Public Advocates,
Inc., along with other concerned groups, filed Williams v.
California on behalf of students in the state's worst
performing schools.49
Williams documented in extensive
detail the maldistribution of resources across schools in the
state and the alarming lack of resources in the state's worst
schools. Evidence gathered in Williams demonstrated that
the basic ingredients of an education-safe facilities,
adequate textbooks, and qualified teachers-were regularly

Education,
available
at
httpJ/www.cde.ca.gov/bemttms/documents/finmin07O9O3.pdf.
46. See id.
47. For archived and current information on student performance on the
CAHSEE, as well as for program announcements and press releases, see Cal.
Dep't of Educ., California High School Examination (CAHSEE),
httpJ/www.cde.ca.gov/ta/tg/hs/index.asp (last visited May 11, 2007).
48. LAURESS L. WISE ET AL., HuMRRO, INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE
CALIFORNIA HIGH SCHOOL EXIT EXAM (CAHSEE): 2005 EVALUATION REPORT,
VOLUME

1,

at

85

(2005),

http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/tg/hs/documents/year6voll.pdf

available

at

[hereinafter HUMRRO

2005 REPORT].

49. First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 1,
Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Super. Ct of Cal., County of San Francisco,
Aug. 14, 2000). For a wealth of information about Williams, including all of the
papers filed with the court, see Decent Schools for California Homepage,
www.decentschools.org (website maintained by the Williams plaintiffs) (last
visited May 11, 2007).
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missing from many of California's schools.5" The students in
these neglected schools were much more likely to be poor or
minority children.5
Williams resulted in a very favorable settlement for the
plaintiff students in 2004, with legislative enactments that
guaranteed significantly improved resources for the state's
When announcing the settlement of
worst schools. 2
candidly
Williams, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
acknowledged California's failure to fairly educate its
students, stating, "Today is a landmark day. Today is a great
victory that we celebrate here for California's neglected
students. And I am here to tell you that we will neglect our
children no more."5 3 However, improvement due to the
important reforms Williams introduced has just begun to be
felt, and the full effect of Williams will take many years to
54
unfold.
Students with disabilities have also passed the CAHSEE
at reduced rates. Only thirty-five percent of students with
disabilities in the Class of 2006 were estimated to have
completed the CAHSEE requirement by the end of the
Unlike many other states, California
eleventh grade.5 5
included no alternative provisions for special education
students to fulfill the exit exam requirement. Disability
Rights Advocates and co-counsel Chavez & Gertler LLP, are
litigating a suit filed in 2002 on behalf of students with
Individualized Education Plans against State respondents to
50. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Expert Reports, Williams v. California, available at
ROBERT CORLEY, THE
http://www.decentschools.orglexperts.php?sub=per;
CONDITION OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOL FACILITIES AND POLICIES RELATED TO
THOSE CONDITIONS; LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, ACCESS TO QUALITY TEACHING:
AN ANALYSIS OF INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS..

51. See, e.g., CORLEY, supra note 50, at 9-11; DARLING-HAMMOND, supra

note 50, at 35-51.
52. See generally Notice of Proposed Settlement, Williams v. California, No.
312236 (Super. Ct of Cal., County of San Francisco, Aug. 13, 2004); see also
Declaration of Jack W. Londen in Response to Defendants' Opposition to Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at 1114-25, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. JCCP-4468
(Super. Ct of Cal., County of Alameda, May 3, 2006) [hereinafter Londen
Declaration].
53. GonzAlez Declaration, supra note 39, at T 5.
54. See Londen Declaration, supra note 52, at 25; BROOKS M. ALLEN, THE
WILLIAMS V. CALIFORNIA SETTLEMENT: THE FIRST YEAR OF IMPLEMENTATION

available
(2005),
http://www.decentschools.org/settlementfWilliamsReportWeb2005.pdf.
55. HUMRRO 2005 REPORT, supra note 48, at 85.

at
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enjoin the CAHSEE requirement. 56 That case, Kidd v.
California5 7 (originally Chapman v. California), which was
coordinated with the Valenzuela case, 58 is ongoing and has
resulted in consecutive interim legislative settlements
allowing special education students to graduate without
passing the CAHSEE if they have fulfilled their other
requirements and attempted to pass the exam.5 9 This
exemption expires, however, with the Class of 2007, and
negotiations between the Kidd parties continue.

III. KEY EXIT EXAM CASES AND THEIR TREATMENT OF
REMEDIES ISSUES

While the popularity of high school exit exams has
skyrocketed over the last decade, and California has only
recently introduced the CAHSEE, some states have employed
exit exams for many years. These tests have inspired legal
challenges since the late 1970s. There is not, however,
extensive case law related to exit exams, so later litigation,
including Valenzuela, concentrates on a relatively small body
of precedent. Some of the cases relate particularly to disabled
students, but their relevant portions are relied on in cases
about non-disabled students. How the main exit exam cases
treated the issue of remedies is briefly summarized below.60
A.

Debra P. v. Turlington

Debra P. v. Turlington is the seminal case addressing
high school exit exams. It remains the key precedent courts
turn to for guidance when facing constitutional questions
regarding the institution of an exit exam. In 1978, Florida
students brought Debra P. as a federal class action to
challenge the Florida exit examination.6 1 Florida began
56. Disability Rights Advocates, Chapman v. California Department of
Education, http'//www.dralegal.org/cases/education-testing/chapman-v-ca.php
(last visited May 11, 2007) [hereinafter DRA].
57. Kidd v. California, No. JCCP-4468 (Super. Ct. of Cal., County of
Alameda, 2006).
58. DRA, supra note 56. The case was coordinated against the opposition of
both sets of plaintiffs, who believed the issues in the cases were distinct.
59. Id.
60. For a helpful general summary of the key exit exam cases, and a
description of the development of high stakes testing, see O'Neill, supra note 32,
at 625-27, 634-57.
61. Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 246 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
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withholding diplomas just two years after the new
requirement was announced, when the exam had only been
administered three times.2 The Debra P. case resulted in two
district court opinions and two appellate opinions. In 1979,
the district court enjoined Florida from imposing the new
diploma penalty for four years, until 1983,63 after holding that
the exam violated due process because of inadequate notice,6 4
and violated equal protection because it discriminated against
African American students given the recent maintenance of a
dual school system.6 5 The Fifth Circuit upheld the injunction
in 1981, but remanded for further findings about whether the
test was invalid because students had not been actually
taught the material.6 6 The district court then found in 1983
that Florida had successfully demonstrated the use of the
exam would not be fundamentally unfair because students
were taught the material tested.6 7 The Eleventh Circuit
(post-Fifth Circuit split) affirmed the district court's ruling in
1984.68
The Debra P. district court granted a four-year injunction
against Florida's use of the diploma penalty without
discussing directly the permissibility of the remedy. 69 The
court noted the injunction would be of limited duration, and
found the injunction was necessary to ensure proper notice
and coverage of the test materials, as well as to purge the
taint of segregated schooling. 70 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
injunction without delving into the appropriateness of the
remedy. 7 '
Significantly, the Fifth Circuit held that the
students had a property interest in their diplomas protected
by both procedural and substantive due process.7 2 The court
remanded the case to resolve the issue of whether the test
could constitutionally be used following the injunction or
whether the due process requirement of fundamental fairness

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See id. at 247-49.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 265-67.
Id. at 268.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, 400 (5th Cir. 1981).
Debra P. v. Turlington, 564 F.Supp. 177, 185-86 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405, 1406 (11th Cir. 1984).
See Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244, 269 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
Id.
See id. at 400.
DebraP., 644 F.2d at 403-04.
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would continue to prohibit its use because students had not
actually been taught the material on the exam.7 3 On remand,
the district court found, after reviewing exhaustive newly
collected evidence from the defendants regarding instruction
in the materials, that fundamental fairness did not prohibit
use of the exam.7 4 This second district court opinion, which
issued in 1983, did not discuss the appropriateness of the
injunctive relief.75 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial
court and declined to extend the injunction, but did not
question the appropriateness of the original injunctive
76
relief.
B. Anderson v. Banks
In Anderson v. Banks, students challenged a Georgia
county's introduction of an exit exam in 1978. 77 A federal
district court found that the diploma requirement could not
be imposed on students who had attended school when an
unconstitutional student tracking system was used and that
the exit exam violated due process unless it was
demonstrated that students were actually taught the test
material. 7 The court ordered the county school district to
issue diplomas to students whose diplomas had been
withheld, and did not discuss directly whether this was a
permissible remedy.79
C. Board of Education v. Ambach
Two disabled students challenged New York's exit exam
requirement in 1979.80 The New York Appellate Court held
that the students had protected property and liberty interests
in their diplomas, and that the State had failed to provide
adequate notice by informing students of the requirement less
than two years before it was imposed.8 ' The court enjoined
the enforcement of an order by the Commissioner of

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 406.
Debra P. v. Turlington, 564 F.Supp. 177, 189 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
See generally id.
See generally Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405 (11th Cir. 1984).
Anderson v. Banks, 520 F. Supp. 472, 476 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 512.
Bd. of Educ. v. Ambach, 436 N.Y.S.2d 564, 566-68 (1981).
Id. at 574-75.
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Education invalidating the students' diplomas, but did not
discuss the appropriateness of this remedy. 2
D. Brookhart v. Illinois State Board of Education
In 1980, a group of disabled students in Illinois
challenged the Peoria school district's new diploma penalty. 3
Peoria started administering its exit exam in 1978 and
imposed the diploma penalty just a year and a half later.8 4
The Seventh Circuit held that the students had a liberty
interest in their diplomas protected by procedural due
process, and that the school district violated the students'
right to adequate notice by its accelerated introduction of the
requirement.8" The court ordered that diplomas be issued to
the plaintiffs, and directly considered the appropriateness of
this remedy.8 6 The court found that the remedy required by
procedural due process would normally be an extended period
of time to prepare for the exam and appropriate remediation
to ensure that all of the material was taught.
The court
found, though, that in this case it would be an undue
hardship for the plaintiffs to return to school as they had
been away from school for two years and now had jobs. 8
E.

GI Forum v. Texas Education Agency

There is a significant gap in time between Brookhart and
the next key exit exam case, GI Forum v. Texas Education
Agency. In 1997, Texas students brought suit in federal court
challenging the state's exit exam.8 9 Texas had employed an
exit exam in some form since 1987.90 The district court in GI
Forum recognized that Texas students have an interest in
their diplomas protected by due process.9 ' The court found,
however, based on the lengthy notice period and the extensive
evidence demonstrating students were taught the test
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
2000).
90.
91.

Id. at 575.
Brookhart v. Ill. State Bd. of Educ., 697 F.2d 179, 181 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id.
Id. at 185-86.
Id. at 188.
Id.
Id.
GI Forum v. Texas Educ. Agency, 87 F.Supp.2d 667, 668 (W.D. Tex.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 682.
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materials, that the exam was not fundamentally unfair.9 2
The court did not discuss the appropriateness of the
requested remedy of enjoining the diploma penalty.
Perhaps due to the tenure of Texas's exit exam and the sheer
size of the state, the GI Forum case was widely followed and
is now one of the core exit exam cases.9 4
F.

Rene v. Reed

In Rene v. Reed, students with disabilities brought a class
action in 1998 challenging Indiana's diploma penalty.95 The
Indiana Appellate Court found that while the students
possessed an interest in their diplomas protected by due
process, the state did not violate that interest through its
three-year notice of the diploma requirement. 96 The court did
address the appropriateness of a remedy of issuing diplomas,
finding that the State's provision of remediation in addition to
the three-to-five year notice was adequate to remedy any
potential due process violations, and that issuance of
diplomas was not necessary.97
IV. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF VALENZUELA
V. O'CONNELL

By the start of the 2005-2006 school year, reports and
media coverage on the Class of 2006's performance on the
CAHSEE alerted the public that California was headed
towards denying diplomas to tens of thousands of students,
and that most of those students would be minority, lowincome, or English Language Learners.9"
The State's
evaluator, HumRRO, estimated that only seventy-eight

92. Id. at 683.
93. See generally id.
94. The opinion is regularly referenced by courts and has been the subject of
separate academic analysis. See, e.g., Blakeley Latham Fernandez, TAAS and
GI Forum v. Texas Education Agency: A Critical Analysis and Proposal for
Redressing Problems with the Standardized Testing in Texas, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J.
143 (2001).
95. Rene v. Reed, 751 N.E.2d 736, 737 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
96. Id. at 747.
97. Id. at 742-43, 745.
98. See, e.g., JOHN ROGERS ET AL., UCLA INST. FOR DEMOCRACY, EDUC. &
ACCESS, MORE QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS: CAHSEE RESULTS, OPPORTUNITY
TO

LEARN

&

THE

CLASS

OF

2006,

at

4

(2005),

available

http://www.idea.gseis.ucla.edu/resources/exitexam/pdfs/IDEA-CAHSEEff.pdf.

at
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percent of the Class of 2006 had passed the CAHSEE by the
end of the eleventh grade, which meant that about 100,000 of
the 465,000 students starting twelfth grade had yet to
complete the requirement. Almost 75,000 of those students
were Latino or African American, 61,000 were economically
disadvantaged,
and 40,000 were English Language
Learners.9 9 Concern among students, parents, teachers, and
advocacy organizations grew. Arturo Gonzdlez, one of the
Authors and a partner at the law firm of Morrison &
Foerster, had previously represented students and parents
who successfully challenged the premature closure of the
public schools in Richmond, California."' Mr. Gonzdlez was
concerned by this new crisis, and assembled a legal team to
investigate what the State had done to ensure that students
in the Class of 2006 were given a fair opportunity to pass the
exam. 10 1 The team found the State had done very little, and
that students' rights to an equal and adequate opportunity to
learn the material tested were in jeopardy. The State had
made paltry efforts to make sure that all students were
exposed to the CAHSEE material and were provided
remediation if they did not pass. The State instead created
its politically popular policy, and then left districts to
implement it with little supervision or support, and with no
accountability. When in the fall of 2005 the State finally
made resources available to districts to provide remediation
for students in the Class of 2006, the funding was severely
inadequate, and many of the eligible students were unable to
benefit. 1 2 Additionally, the SPI and Board had completely
ignored a mandate from the Legislature to study the
appropriateness of using alternative assessments for students
who had not passed, but had demonstrated through other
evidence that they may have achieved the Standards. 10 3

99. HUMRRO 2005 Report, supra note 48, at 85.
100. See Butt v. California, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480 (Cal. 1992).
101. The Morrison & Foerster attorney team consisted of partner Arturo J.

GonzAlez and associates Shane Brun, Vanina Sucharitkul, Christopher J.
Young and Johanna Hartwig, aided by frequent consultation with partner Jack
W. Londen, lead pro bono counsel in the Williams litigation.
102. GonzAlez Declaration, supra note 39, at IT 37-38; Declaration of Karen
Tobi in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at Exhibits A-E,
Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. CPF-06506050 (Super. Ct of Cal., County of San
Francisco, Mar. 23, 2006).
103. This failure to study alternatives in a timely fashion was the subject of a
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Mr. GonzAlez wrote a letter in October 2005, reminding
Superintendent O'Connell and other defendants of their duty
to study alternative assessments.'014 Almost all states that
use exit exams include some form of alternative
assessments. 10 5 SPI O'Connell responded by asking for
assistance in convening a panel of experts. Mr. Gonzalez
agreed and fielded a panel of nationally-recognized experts. 10 6
But SPI O'Connell backed away and refused to use the expert
panel. Instead, he put together a single public meeting in
December of 2005, presided over by lawyers and political
appointees, but not attended by himself or any members of
the Board. 0 7 SPI O'Connell then announced by public letter,
a mere three weeks later, that he had determined
alternatives were not appropriate. 0 8 In the same letter the
SPI identified a potentially appropriate alternative, but
stated that it was not viable because it would be too late to
implement for the Class of 2006.19 Two months later the

writ challenge in a coordinated case, brought by Public Advocates, Inc., on
behalf of the Californians for Justice Education Fund, who also filed an amicus
brief in Valenzuela. See Memorandum and Points of Authorities in Support of
Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate, California Justice Education Fund v.
State Board of Education, No. JCCP-4468, (Super. Ct. of Cal., County of
Alameda, Apr. 17, 2006).
104. Letter from Arturo J. Gonzalez, Partner, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, to
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Ruth Green, President, State Bd. of Educ., &
Jack O'Connell, State Superintendent of Pub. Instruction (Oct. 11, 2005) (on file
with the Authors).
105. Declaration of Raymond L. Pecheone in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
7, 17-23, 36-72, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. CPFPreliminary Injunction at
06506050 (Super. Ct of Cal., County of San Francisco, Mar. 23, 2006). See
generally LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND ET AL., SCH. REDESIGN NETWORK AT
STANFORD UNIV.,
GRADUATION

MULTIPLE MEASURES
(2005),

APPROACHES

TO

HIGH

SCHOOL

at
http://srnleads.org/data/pdfs/multiple-measures.pdf.
106. Letter from Arturo J. Gonzdlez, Partner, Morrison & Foerster, LLP, to
Marsha Bedwell, Karen Steentofte, & Amy Bisson-Holloway, Counsel for Cal.
Dep't of Educ. (Nov. 11, 2005) (on file with authors).
107. Letter from Jack O'Connell, Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, to
"Interested Persons" (Nov. 30, 2005) (on file with authors) (announcing public
meeting on December 9, 2005, to provide time for public comment on
alternatives to the CAHSEE).
108. Letter from Jack O'Connell, Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, to State
Board of Education Members & Interested Persons (Jan. 6, 2006) (on file with
Authors) [hereinafter Jan. 2006 Letter] (attaching documents entitled "Options
for Students Not Passing the Exam" and "Compendium of Considered
Alternatives").
109. Id.
available
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Board confirmed the SPI's recommendation after barely an
hour of discussion, including public comment, although it was
addressing the issue of alternatives for the first time.11 °
By February 2006, it was clear that the State was going
to take no effective steps to rectify the CAHSEE system's
problems for the Class of 2006. While he rejected alternatives
in his January letter, SPI O'Connell identified available
"options" for students who did not pass by the end of the
twelfth grade, such as studying for the test through adult
school or re-enrolling for another year of high school. The
State, though, had made no effort and devoted no resources to
ensure that these options would be available. 1 ' In fact, the
most important option, re-enrollment, was left to the
discretion of districts, and, because of the overcrowding and
fiscal pressures on poor-performing districts, was likely to be
an illusory option for many students in the Class of 2006 who
did not pass.
After assessing the State's unwillingness to take any
adequate steps on its own to help students in the Class of
2006, Morrison & Foerster filed suit on February 8, 2006.112
110. Declaration

of Chris Young in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for

5-9, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. CPF-06506050
Preliminary Injunction at
(Super. Ct of Cal., County of San Francisco, Mar. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Young
Declaration].
111. The "options" the SPI identified in his January 6, 2006, letter were, with
comment on state action to ensure availability noted: if still enrolled in school,
receiving remedial instruction as required by 60851(f) (no money provided for
this option until Fall of 2006, at which time only enough money provided to
serve students in schools where more than twenty-eight percent had not
passed); enrolling for an additional year of school (left up to discretion of school
districts; many of the districts with the most non-passers are already
overcrowded); independent study (no money or provision made for CAHSEE
preparation through this program); charter school (very few charter schools; left
up to their discretion to admit CAHSEE non-passers); adult school (no money or
provision made for CAHSEE preparation through this program); receive high
school diploma through community college that did not require CAHSEE (no
money or provision made for this; only a handful of community colleges provide
this option); obtain diploma through county court or juvenile school (applies to
very few students); pass the California High School Proficiency Exam to obtain
a diploma equivalent (no money or provision made for this program; equivalence
certificate much less valuable than diploma); and pass the GED (no money or
provision made for this program; GED less valuable than diploma). Jan. 2006
Letter, supra note 108.
112. See generally Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for
Injunctive and Declaratory Relief to Prevent the State from Violating Plaintiffs'
Fundamental Right to a Public Education, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. CPF06506050 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Complaint].
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The complaint was filed in state court on behalf of ten named
plaintiffs and all students who were similarly situated,"'
meaning all students in the Class of 2006 who were expected
to complete their graduation requirements by the end of the
school year except for passing the exit exam. The plaintiffs
sued the State of California, the California Department of
Education, the State Board of Education, and the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction, Jack O'Connell
(defendants)." 4 The complaint asserted claims based on the
students' rights to equal protection,"15 due process116 and the
fundamental right to education under the California
of alternative
Constitution, 11 7 as well as to a good faith study
8
assessments under California statutory law."1
At the end of March 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion to
enjoin the defendants from withholding diplomas from the
Class of 2006 based on not passing the CAHSEE." 9 The
preliminary injunction motion briefing relied on extensive
evidence demonstrating the inequality and inadequacy of
students' exposure to the test material, and included over
forty fact and expert declarations.' 2 ° Under an order granting
expedited discovery, the plaintiffs took over a dozen
depositions to prepare the motion. Much of the motion's
supporting evidence was drawn from reports produced by
HumRRO, the independent contractor engaged by the State
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 43-44.
116. See id. at 45.
117. See id. at 43.
118. See Complaint, supra note 112, at 44-45.
119. See generally Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. CPF-06506050
(Super. Ct of Cal., County of San Francisco, Mar. 23, 2006) [hereinafter Motion].
In addition to the preliminary injunction motion, the plaintiffs overcame a
demurrer, and also briefed a protracted discovery dispute regarding the
defendants' refusal to produce relevant documents based on the "official
information privilege."
120. See generally Notice of Motion and Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. CPF-06506050 (Super. Ct of Cal., County of San
2-11;
Francisco, Mar. 23, 2006); Gonzdlez Declaration, supra note 39, at
Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9-11, Valenzuela
v. O'Connell, No. JCCP-4468 (Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Alameda, May 3,
2006) [hereinafter Reply]; see generally Supplemental Declaration of Arturo J.
Gonzdlez in Response to Defendants' Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. JCCP-4468 (Super. Ct. of Cal., County
of Alameda, May 3, 2006).
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to study the implementation of the CAHSEE.
The trial court record showed that lower passage rates
were closely correlated with the type of resource disparities
documented in Williams and still plaguing California
schools.'2 1 Students who were not passing the CAHSEE,
mainly poor and minority students, were consistently in
schools with underqualified teachers and fewer resources.
For example, according to research performed by Dr. John
Rogers of UCLA, another Author in this Symposium issue,
students in schools with low CAHSEE passage rates were
eleven times more likely to experience serious shortages of
credentialed teachers than students in schools with high
passage rates. 122 Furthermore, many schools had still not
accomplished the alignment of curriculum, instruction and
tested material, or provided the guaranteed remediation, that
was necessary to adequately expose students to the CAHSEE
material. 123 Poor and minority students were much more
likely to populate these lagging schools. Particularly for
English Language Learners, there was a demonstrated gap
between what students were taught and what they were
24
tested on. 1
These CAHSEE disparities tied to low-performing schools
should not have surprised the defendants. Indeed, the State
of California itself had recently highlighted the dire state of
schools. The introduction to the 2003 version of the State's
Master Plan for Education declared, "The sobering reality of
California's education system is that too few schools can now
provide the conditions in which the state can fairly ask
students to learn to the highest standards." 25
When
Governor Schwarzenegger announced the settlement of
121. See HUMRRO 2005 REPORT, supra note 48, at 120-125 (documenting the
correlation between underqualified teachers in a school and low passage rates).
122. Declaration of John Rogers in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at
18; Valenzuela v. O'Connell, Case No. CPF
06506050 (Super. Ct of Cal., County of San Francisco, March 23, 2006)
[hereinafter Rogers Declaration]; ROGERS ET AL., supra note 98, at 3.
123. HUMRRO 2005 REPORT, supra note 48, at 148-150, 174-76.
124. Declaration of Patricia Gdndara, Ph.D., in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion
for Preliminary Injunction at %%17-18, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, Case No. CPF
06506050 (Super. Ct. of Cal., County of San Francisco, March 23, 2006)
[hereinafter Gandara Declaration].
125. The Joint Committee to Develop a Master Plan for Education, The
California Master Plan for Education, Joint Committee to Develop a Master
Plan for Education, available at httpJ/localhs.com/policy/mp-intro.asp
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Williams, he echoed this conclusion, "[Our children are] not
getting their equal education materials, reading materials,
homework materials. They're not getting the same quality
teachers.
These kids were not getting a fair chance to
succeed."126
After reviewing the vigorous briefing and oral argument
by both sides, Judge Robert Freedman of the Alameda County
Superior Court granted the injunction on May 12, 2006.127
The defendants immediately appealed the decision directly to
the California Supreme Court, which voted four-to-three to
grant a stay on May 24, 2006, and ordered the Court of
Appeal to decide the appeal on an expedited basis. 12 The
four-sentence
Supreme Court order questioned the
appropriateness of the remedy. 12 9 After further briefing and
oral argument, the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, vacated the
injunction on August 11, 2006.130 The Appellate Court held
that the trial court inappropriately balanced the harms in
applying the preliminary injunction standard and that the
remedy of allowing class members to graduate was beyond
the authority of the court.1 31 The Appellate Court also,
however, "accept[ed] the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs
established a likelihood of success on the merits as to the
denial of their fundamental right to equal educational
opportunity."132 The parties started settlement discussions
shortly thereafter, and as of the finalization of this Article,
the trial court had granted final approval of the settlement,
and legislation based on a settlement agreement was
progressing rapidly through the California Legislature. 3 3

126. Gonzdlez Declaration, supra note 39, at 5.
127. See generally Order Granting Preliminary Injunction and Case
Management Orders, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, Coordinated Judicial Proceeding
Case No. JCCP-4468 (Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Alameda, May 12, 2006)
[hereinafter Order]. The contents of the preliminary injunction order and the
subsequent decisions will be discussed below.
128. O'Connell v. Super. Ct., No. JCCP-4468, slip op. (Cal. May 24, 2006).
129. Id.
130. O'Connell v. Super. Ct., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147, 150 (Ct. App. 2006).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 157.
133. See infra Part V for a description of the settlement talks and resulting
agreement.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF VALENZUELA'S TREATMENT OF REMEDIES

The Valenzuela preliminary injunction motion resulted in
three rulings. This section describes these rulings, and
analyzes the Appellate 'Court's opinion, which was the only
ruling to substantively address whether issuing an injunction
against the CAHSEE diploma penalty is an appropriate
remedy.
A. Alameda County Superior Court Ruling
On May 12, 2006, Judge Freedman of the Alameda
County Superior Court issued an eighteen-page order
granting a preliminary injunction against the use of the
diploma penalty for the Class of 2006.'11 In applying the
preliminary injunction standard, Judge Freedman balanced
the harms strongly in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the
harm to otherwise qualified students of not receiving their
diplomas would be severe, and that little to no harm would
result for the defendants from delaying the imposition of the
diploma penalty for one year. 135 Judge Freedman found the
evidence strongly supported the plaintiffs' equal protection
and fundamental right to education claims. 136
Judge
Freedman noted that he did not find the due process claim
persuasive, but only devoted one short paragraph to
considering it. 13

Judge Freedman's minimal due process

analysis, however, is at odds with his finding the argument
not compelling, given that he acknowledged the defendants'
efforts to establish curricular and instructional validity-key
to the fundamental fairness question of whether students
were actually taught what was tested-were "meaningfully
13
less" than those ultimately accepted by the Debra P. court.
The judge also did not give weight to the plaintiffs' statutory
claim regarding alternative assessments. 39 Judge Freedman
apparently believed that allowing otherwise qualified
students to graduate was a remedy within the court's power,
as he issued the injunction without discussing its

134. Order, supra note 127, at 18.
135. Id. at 7-9.
136. Id. at 9-12.

137. Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 9-10.
139. Id. at 9.
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appropriateness.
B. CaliforniaSupreme Court Ruling
The defendants asked the trial court to stay the
injunction pending appeal, but the request was denied. The
defendants then bypassed the Appellate Court and filed a
writ of supersedeas to the California Supreme Court, which
on May 26, 2006, issued a stay of the injunction while it was
appealed on an expedited basis. 140 The court did not decide
the appeal itself, but sent it back to the Appellate Court, with
a four-sentence ruling that included only one substantive
element:
Because at this juncture this court is not persuaded that
the relief granted by the trial court's preliminary
injunction-which would require school districts to grant
high school diplomas to students despite the students'
failure to pass the [CAHSEE]-would be an appropriate
remedy even if plaintiffs were to prevail in their
underlying claims, the injunction issued by the trial court
in its order of May 12, 2006, is stayed pending 14
the Court of
Appeal's determination of this writ proceeding. '
The writ was considered by the Supreme Court en banc." 62
Four of the seven justices voted to grant the stay and to
remand to the Appellate Court; one justice would have denied
the stay but would have remanded; two of the justices would
43
have denied the stay and upheld the injunction.1
C. California Court of Appeal, First District,Ruling
A three judge panel of the Court of Appeal, First District,
vacated the preliminary injunction on August 11, 2006, after
14
briefing by the parties and amici curiae and oral argument.
The Appellate Court held that the trial court abused its
discretion by not taking into account the harms to the State's
accountability system and that the remedy of a statewide

140. O'Connell
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. O'Connell
Public Advocates
offered valuable
challenge.

v. Super. Ct., No. JCCP-4468, slip op. (Cal. May 24, 2006).

v. Super. Ct., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147, 150 (Ct. App. 2006).
and Disability Rights Advocates submitted amicus briefs and
assistance to the Valenzuela plaintiffs throughout their
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injunction allowing students in the Class of 2006 to receive
their diplomas was impermissible. 145 The Appellate Court
did, however, support the trial court's finding that the
plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their underlying claim that
they were denied the right to equal educational opportunity
as substantial evidence showed students in the Class of 2006
had not been adequately or equally prepared to pass the
46
exam. 1
The Appellate Court found the injunction was
impermissible because it encroached on the authority of the
legislative and executive branches by being unacceptably
specific. 147 It also found the remedy was not tailored to the
rights asserted. 148 The Appellate Court additionally ruled the
injunction was overbroad as it benefited some students who
had not been injured. 1 49 This Article addresses the first two
reasons the Appellate Court rejected the trial court's remedy.
1.

Appellate Court's Treatment of Separation of Powers

The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court
trespassed in the territories of the Legislative and Executive
branches by ordering a statewide injunction of the CAHSEE
diploma penalty. 5 ° The Appellate Court emphasized that
educational policy is the province of the political branches
and that the judicial branch must avoid treading on this turf
To support its holding, the Appellate
as much as possible.'
Court discussed the two key California cases relied on by both
parties regarding plaintiffs' rights to education under the
California Constitution, Serrano v. Priest (1)152 (Serrano II)
In Serrano 11, the plaintiffs
and Butt v. California.'5 '
challenged the constitutionality of California's educational
funding scheme,' and in Butt, the plaintiffs challenged the

145. Id. at 162, 167-68.

146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

157.
162-66.
167-68.
168-170.

150. O'Connell, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 162-66.

151.
152.
1976)).
153.
1992)).
154.

Id. at 155-56, 165-66.
Id. at 163-64 (discussing Serrano v. Priest, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Cal.
Id. at 164 (discussing Butt v. California, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480 (Cal.
Id. at 163 (discussing Serrano, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 353-55).
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constitutionality of the Richmond school district closing its
schools six weeks early due to lack of funds. 15 The Appellate
Court found that Serrano II did not provide support for the
injunction because the California Supreme Court left it up to
the Legislature to devise a statewide school funding scheme
that would withstand constitutional review, and gave the
State six years to do so. 156 The Appellate Court found that
Butt also did not support the injunction because the State
was not specifically ordered to keep the Richmond schools
open for the remainder of the school year, but was simply
ordered to take steps to protect students' rights. 15 7 The
Appellate Court contrasted the Valenzuela diploma penalty
injunction to these rulings, finding that the trial court
impermissibly limited the political branches' discretion to
158
decide how to make the policy constitutional.
Both the Appellate 'Court's separation of powers
reasoning and its reading of the precedent are flawed.
Separation of powers constraints rightly prevent courts from
attempting to use their authority to impose policy preferences
when not necessary to protect legal rights, and draw the
boundaries of necessity tightly in order to keep policymaking
in the more democratic branches. But separation of powers is
undermined when courts are precluded from playing their
constitutional role of protecting legal rights because their
orders will operate within the context of contested policy
matters.
In Valenzuela, the trial court needed to act
immediately in order to halt an ongoing constitutional
violation and prevent imminent further violations.
As
discussed below, there was not a selection of remedies that
could effect this protection. Indeed, at the time the injunction
issued, graduation ceremonies for the Class of 2006 were only
a few weeks away. Caps and gowns needed to be ordered;
announcements and programs needed to be prepared.
Students needed to make decisions about their next steps for
education or employment.
In light of these realities, and the finding that many of
the state's students had not been adequately prepared to pass

155.
156.
157.
158.

Butt, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483.
O'Connell, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 163-64.
Id. at 164-65.
Id. at 165.
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the CAHSEE, the trial court ordered the well-established
remedy of enjoining enforcement of an unconstitutional
statute. This imposition of a temporary limitation did not
impose a forward-looking policy preference, as if, for example,
the Serrano 11 court had decided to select one particular
funding scheme proffered by a party.
The deference of the Serrano H court to the Legislature's
discretion is also inapposite because of the disparate nature
of the problems at issue and their potential solutions. In the
Serrano suit, California needed to fix its entire school funding
mechanism, traditionally one of the most complicated
statutory systems state and local governments have to deal
with. 15 9 Students' rights could not be protected until this
whole system was fixed, and the whole system could not be
fixed rapidly. For the Valenzuela preliminary injunction
decision, the problem at issue-the constitutionality of an exit
exam graduation requirement as applied to students in one
year's graduating class-was much narrower in scope. There
was only one appropriate remedy which could adequately
protect student rights, and that was to allow otherwise
qualified students to graduate, as opposed to multiple policy
approaches the Legislature could consider as potential
remedies. Students' constitutional rights could thereby be
protected in Valenzuela without requiring extra time for the
State to conform its behavior, as was necessary in Serrano.
Further, the Valenzuela record highlights how leaving it
to the State to devise its own solution for CAHSEE's
constitutional infirmity would extend the plaintiffs' injury:
the State argued that the appropriate remedy was to allow
existing policies and reforms to unfold. 160 Whether or not this
"remedy" might ultimately rectify the State's unconstitutional
conduct is unknown, though unlikely, but the trial court
properly rejected this wait-and-see approach, as it could not
possibly make the plaintiffs whole in this case. The plaintiff
students had participated for up to thirteen years in an
education system which provided starkly different levels of
opportunity to learn; the improvement the new reforms might

159. See Serrano, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 348-52.
160. Petitioners' Traverse to Petition for Writ of Certiorari and/or Mandate
or Other Appropriate Relief at 11, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, A113933 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 23, 2006) [hereinafter Traverse].
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eventually make could not help them in any timely fashion,
even if students were allowed to re-enroll. The Legislature
and the Executive, on the other hand, had full discretion for
seven years from the inception of the policy-and ample
warning from exit exam litigations in other states, from
criticism from the public, and from the Kidd litigation-to
implement an exit exam system that was likely to pass
constitutional muster.
The Appellate Court's reading of Butt also does not
provide convincing support for its holding that the injunction
violated separation of powers limitations.1 6 1 Butt is clear that
the only action the defendants could have taken to conform
their behavior to the California Constitution was to make
sure students in Richmond were not denied their last six
weeks of school, but were able to finish the 1990-1991 school
year like other students throughout the state. 162 The only
discretion the California Supreme Court left to the
defendants was to figure out how the State entity was going
to manage to keep the schools open, in other words, the
mechanism by which they would pay to do so. 163 The Butt
Court did not leave it up to the defendants to devise some
other remedy
they
determined would
rectify the
unconstitutionality, for example, tacking on extra hours of
after-school lessons during the following school year."M
Likewise, for the Valenzuela defendants, there was only
one action which could (at least, temporarily) fix the policy's
constitutional infirmity, and that was to delay the imposition
of the diploma penalty so that the Class of 2006 was not
subject to it. When the injunction motion was filed, the
defendants were already violating the California Constitution
by maintaining a system which did not provide equivalent
preparation for the CAHSEE.165 The defendants were going
to further violate equal protection and the fundamental right
161. See O'Connell, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 164-65.
162. See Butt v. California, 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480, 491-93 (Cal. 1992).
163. See id. at 500-04.
164. Id. at 492-93.
165. See id. at 496 ("In sum, the California Constitution guarantees 'basic'
equality in public education, regardless of district residence. Because education
is a fundamental interest in California, denials of basic educational equality on
the basis of district residence are subject to strict scrutiny. The State is the
entity with ultimate responsibility for equal operation of the common school
system.").
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to education, and additionally violate due process, by their
imminent denial of diplomas.166 Unlike in Butt, there was no
logistical decision which the trial court needed to leave to the
defendants' discretion about how to accomplish not imposing
the diploma penalty on the Class of 2006.
2. Appellate Court'sAnalysis of Remedy Being Tailored
to Claims Asserted
The Appellate Court also rejected the preliminary
injunction on the basis that receipt of a diploma was not an
appropriate remedy because a diploma is not a protected part
of the fundamental right to education, using harsh language
to do so: "A high school diploma is not an education, any more
than a birth certificate is a baby." 6 7 The Appellate Court
found that a diploma is only a marker of an education, and
therefore the right to education protected under the
California Constitution, and underlying the plaintiffs' equal
protection claim, includes access to educational opportunities,
but not access to the diploma resulting from those
opportunities. 16 The Appellate Court went further to declare
that giving diplomas to students who had not passed the exit
exam would be harmful to the students by indicating that
they had completed an education and developed skills they
1 69
had not.
The unreasonableness of the Appellate Court's
interpretation of the relationship between a diploma and
learning opportunities themselves, and how they both relate
to a student's right to education, is illuminated by the light of
current reality. Without question, the fundamental right to
education must include the right to the meat of an education,

166. The Court of Appeal faulted the plaintiffs for creating a timing issue by
waiting until February to file suit. O'Connell, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 170. Note,
however, that this decision was substantially based on the plaintiffs' good faith
efforts to work with the defendants to rectify their behavior before filing suit.
Moreover, the SBE scheduled alternative assessments for the CAHSEE as an
agenda item for January 2006, and then pulled the item without explanation.
Alternatives were not considered or voted upon by the Board for the first time
until March 8, 2006, just months before graduation ceremonies for the first
class subject to the diploma requirement were to commence. See Young
5-9.
Declaration, supra note 110, at
167. O'Connell, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 167.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 168.
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But the right to learning
learning opportunities.
opportunities, without the right to concretely benefit from
However much a student may have
them, is hollow.
developed as a result of taking classes, and may internally
benefit, that student must rely on other people's decisions to
succeed and progress after leaving high school. And those
other people must have some way of knowing that a student
has an education. Our society developed diplomas as the
shortcut to that information. While colleges and employers
may require additional exams to assess candidates' skills and
knowledge, this diploma shortcut is an indispensable
efficiency. As a result, without a diploma, students do not
qualify for admission to four-year universities, for many
scholarships and for many jobs.
California is one of the few states to have established
that the right to education is fundamental and deserves the
most stringent legal protection. 170 The motivation for that
protection is that Californians believe education is crucial to
how good a life a person will enjoy and what type of member
of society that person will be. When holding that education is
a fundamental interest, the first Serrano court described the
"indispensable role which education plays in the modern
industrial state" as having two aspects: "First, education is a
major determinant of an individual's chances for economic
and social success in our competitive society; second,
education is a unique influence on a child's development as a
citizen and his participation in political and community
life."' 7' These concerns focus on an individual's post-high
school life and opportunities.
In sharp contrast to Serrano's eloquent support for this
Californian priority, yet akin to the CAHSEE system itself,
the Appellate Court's interpretation of the fundamental right
to education places the burden solely on students for the
current reality that a high school diploma is a required tool
for success in our society. Protecting learning opportunities
without protecting the diploma seriously undermines the
practical priority our state has placed on education, and
especially hurts many poor and minority students for whom a
high school diploma may be the only avenue to a more secure
170. Id. at 156.
171. Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255-56 (Cal. 1971).
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and successful life than their parents.
3.

Appellate Court'sFailureto Assess and Credit Due
Process Claim

The Appellate Court could have evaluated the plaintiffs'
due process claim as an alternative basis for upholding the
injunction, but failed to do so. The Appellate Court instead
merely mentioned that the trial court found the equal
protection and fundamental right arguments compelling, but
had not found the due process argument compelling, and so
would focus its review on the former. 17 2 In a footnote, it then
concurred with the trial court that the due process argument
was not compelling, and listed the key due process cases the
plaintiffs and amici cited, but offered no analysis.1 7 3 By
failing to discuss the due process claim, which was fully
argued in the briefing, the Appellate Court sidestepped
analyzing key precedent which would have supported the
injunction. 174 Since due process is central to almost all of the
prior exit exam cases, the Appellate Court neglecting to
review the argument as an alternative basis is troubling.
Although the trial court did not find the due process
claim persuasive, its analysis was scant, and actually
indicated that if the court had reviewed the issue more closely
it would have found merit to the argument. The court found
that California's efforts to establish curricular and
instructional validity-that the curriculum covered what
was tested and that students were taught what was tested-were "meaningfully less" than that accepted in the Debra P.
case. This suggests that upon closer analysis the court might
have inferred that the defendants had not demonstrated
students were actually taught what was tested. 175 The

172. O'Connell, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 156.
173. Id. at 167 n.17.
174. One of the only academic commentators on possible litigation targeting
the CAHSEE addressed the issue in 2000 and thought, as the Authors contend,
that the CAHSEE might be vulnerable to due process attacks on the grounds
that students were not taught what was tested given that the State had not
aligned curriculum or instruction to the Standards. See Nebgen, supra note 20,
at 375. Interestingly, the commentator thought an equal protection argument
unlikely to succeed, although she framed a different equal protection argument
than the one that prevailed in Valenzuela. See id. at 376.
175. Order, supra note 127, at 9-10.
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submitted very strong evidence
in fact
plaintiffs
demonstrating that the defendants could not meet this
176
fundamental fairness due process test set out in Debra P.
For example, the fall before the plaintiffs were supposed to
graduate, only forty-seven percent of the schools surveyed
reported that they had completely covered the CAHSEE Math
Standards; forty-nine percent reported complete coverage of
the ELA Standards. 177 Worse, only three percent of schools
surveyed reported that in the years when students in the
Class of 2006 were supposed to be taught the Math CAHSEE
skills, their schools completely covered the related Math
Standards. 7 ' English Language Learners were taught 17a9
curriculum that did not fully cover the CAHSEE Standards.
Many students, especially low-income, minority and English
Language Learner students, reported that they faced
questions on the exam about topics they had never studied
before. 8 0 Only fifty-two percent of schools reported that they
were providing the CAHSEE remediation required by
statute.'8' Moreover, many students, and particularly the
students in low-performing schools, were taught the CAHSEE
materials by underqualified and inexperienced teachers.'8 2
Debra P. sets a rigorous precedent for how state
defendants must demonstrate that students have had an
adequate opportunity to learn the material tested before they
can impose a diploma penalty without violating due process.
The court enjoined Florida's exit exam for four years. Only
176. See Motion, supra note 119, at 22-25; Reply, supra note 120, at 9-14;
Plaintiffs and Real Parties in Interest's Return to the Petition at 37-41,
Valenzuela v. O'Connell, A113933 (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2006).
177. See HUMRRO 2005 REPORT, supra note 48, at 148. While an additional
forty-seven percent reported coverage of most ELA standards, and forty-three
percent reported coverage of "most" Math Standards, "most" covers the wide
range of sixty-one-to-ninety-five percent of the tested Standards. See id.
178. See id. at 150. Note, though, that forty-one percent of schools surveyed
reported "don't know." Still, nineteen percent reported little coverage (less than
forty percent) and nine percent reported only partial coverage (forty-to-sixty
percent). See id.
16-19; HUMRRO 2005
179. See Gdndara Declaration, supra note 124, at
REPORT, supra note 48, at 152; see also Opposition to Motion for Preliminary
Injunction at 13, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, Judicial Council Proceeding No. 4468
(Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Alameda, April 27, 2006) ("[English language
learners] require[ instruction different from the standard curriculum.").
180. HUMRRO 2005 REPORT, supra note 48, at 213-214.
181. Id. at 175-176.
182. Id. at v, 239; Rogers Declaration, supra note 122, at $$ 17-18.
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after Florida submitted evidence of an extraordinarily
comprehensive and detailed evaluation of coverage of the test
materials did the Debra P. Court rule that the exam was not
fundamentally unfair.m
For example, as part of their
evaluation, Florida sent surveys to every single teacher in the
state, received responses from about seventy percent, and
4
made an on-site investigation of every single district.1
California's efforts to establish curricular and instructional
validity pales in comparison to Florida's.1 85 California only
collected data from eleven percent of high schools and from
about seven percent of teachers of CAHSEE materials.18 6 It
made on-site assessments at less than three percent of high
schools.8 7 This falls well short of what the Debra P. Court
would accept as evidence demonstrating the exam is not
fundamentally unfair. Although Debra P. is on all fours with
this exit exam case, the Valenzuela court neglected to address
it.
Likewise, the GI Forum court only denied the plaintiffs'
due process claim after acknowledging the substantial and
systematic evidence demonstrating students had an
opportunity to learn the material.' 8 The court reviewed the
strict connection between the state-mandated curriculum and
the exam and the evidence that students were automatically
provided remediation if they did not pass. 8 9 Again, the
Valenzuela evidence showed there was not a tight alignment
between curricula and test across the state and that a
significant portion of students were not being provided
remediation. The GI Forum Court would have been unlikely
to dismiss the plaintiffs' due process claim if it were judging
the CAHSEE system.
The Appellate Court, however,
sidestepped the due process claim, even though due process

183. Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405, 1407-12 (11th Cir. 1984).
184. Id. at 1408.
185. See Declaration of Kurt F. Geisinger in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at T 25-32, 55-62, Valenzuela v. O'Connell, No. CPF06506050 (Super. Ct. of Cal., County of San Francisco, Mar. 23, 2006)
[hereinafter Geisinger Declaration].
186. Id.; HUMRRO 2005 REPORT, supra note 48, at 102, 104.
187. See HuMRRO 2005 REPORT, supra note 48, at 106 (reporting that site
visits were conducted at forty-seven of California's 2208 high schools).
188. GI Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 671-84 (W.D. Tex.
2000).
189. Id. at 671-673, 676.
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analysis is central to GI Forum as well as most other key exit
exam cases.
V. EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES
FOR VALENZUELA

The Authors believe that the Appellate Court erred in
vacating the injunction, for the reasons explained above as
well as for other reasons. Since, based on its earlier four to
three opinion, the California Supreme Court was unlikely to
reverse, and because of the imminent need to obtain some
form of relief for the tens of thousands of class members, we
reluctantly decided not to appeal the decision. Instead, the
parties immediately started settlement talks to discuss
changes the defendants could make to avoid prolonged
litigation through, for example, a new preliminary injunction
motion requesting a different remedy. For the benefit of
other interested parties, either in California or in other
states, we take this opportunity to briefly consider whether
some alternative strategies might have avoided the Appellate
Court's conclusion that the remedy was inappropriate. 190 We
will assume for the sake of focusing on the remedies issue
that the Appellate Court was satisfied with the application of
the preliminary injunction standard in the balancing of
harms. This section will conclude with a short update on the
state of the settlement negotiations.
A. Seeking Different Relief
Although we believe strongly that the trial court had
ample discretion and authority to issue the requested
injunction, the most obvious change to the Valenzuela
litigation strategy would have been to request a remedy other
than an injunction against the diploma penalty for the Class
of 2006. This is also the alternative that deserves the most
consideration. Here are three examples of other relief the
plaintiffs could have sought.
First, plaintiffs might have requested guaranteed access
190. The Valenzuela case appears to have been closely monitored by
organizations and entities nationwide interested in exit exam policies. For
example, the Center on Education Policy described the case in detail in its last
annual report. KOBER ET AL., supra note 5, at 14-15, 20, 22-23. The report
observes that the outcome from the case would likely affect policies in other
states. Id. at 22-23.
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to re-enrollment for students who had not passed by the end
of the twelfth grade, or guaranteed access to further
remediation outside of normal enrollment.
Given the
Appellate Court's conclusion that further educational
opportunities are what constitute the right to education,19 1
the court might have granted such an injunction. This choice
also might have avoided separation of powers concerns as it
would not interfere, according to the Appellate Court's
characterization, with the defendants' new accountability
system.
Second, the relief could have focused on earlier inputs to
student preparation for achieving the standards tested by the
CAHSEE. William Koski of Stanford Law School has
proposed the approach of exploiting the standards-based
reform movement through education litigation to enhance
educational equity and opportunity.192
Professor Koski
argues that the standards movement provides litigators and
courts a valuable tool: standards are politically-approved
measures which a court can use to establish and define the
contours of state accountability to students for providing an
equal and adequate opportunity to learn material the
students are now expected to know. 193 They can be used to
support statutory and constitutional claims and can predicate
a remedy closely tied to the existing accountability system.
So, for instance, in this case, the injunction could have
required alignment of curriculum, instruction and the
CAHSEE material in order to make certain that students had
191. O'Connell v. Super. Ct., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147, 165 (Ct. App. 2006).
192. William Koski, EducationalOpportunityand Accountability in an Eraof
Standards-Based School Reform, 12 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 301, 302 (2001).
Professor Kevin Welner picks up on and supports Koski's suggestion:
[Iinstead of focusing on the "punishment" (the retention or diploma
denial), students' legal attacks might challenge the state's failure to
fulfill its voluntarily assumed affirmative duty to provide each student
with a fair opportunity to learn the material covered by the high-stakes
exam.
Kevin Welner, Tracking in an Era of Standards:Low-Expectation Classes Meet
High-ExpectationLaws, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 699,734 (2001).
193. Koski, supra note 192, at 306-315.
Professor Maurice Dyson of
Columbia also explores this idea by discussing how opportunity to learn due
process rights could be used to drive "educational adequacy" cases, in which

plaintiffs' claims target the right to a certain standard of education being
provided. See Maurice R. Dyson, Leave No Child Behind: Normative Proposals
to Link EducationalAdequacy Claims and High Stakes Assessment Due Process
Challenges, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 1, 33-60 (2002).
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an adequate and equal opportunity to learn the Standards
tested by the CAHSEE, as required by due process and equal
This is, in fact, something that is already
protection.
mandated by California statute: the enacting legislation
requires that the CAHSEE have curricular validity, which
means that the curricula cover what is tested, and that it
have instructional validity, which means the students are
4
taught what is tested.1
An injunction requiring alignment of curriculum,
instruction and tested material might have gained the
Appellate Court's approval, or at least avoided the major
issues the court found with the diploma penalty injunction. It
might have assuaged the separation of powers concerns, as it
would have tracked politically-developed education policy
choices. Professor Kevin Welner of the University of Colorado
observes that such a "shift in [remedial] focus . . .puts the
court in the position of enforcing, rather than overturning,
state policy. . .""I And Professor Koski encourages that,
"Armed with specific, clear, and meaningful standards that
are the product of such an extensive political process, courts
are better positioned to overcome their self-imposed obstacles
to policy reform."1 96 A standards-based remedy would also
have given the defendants discretion about how to achieve
alignment, and likely allotted time in which to do so, which
were key concerns of the Appellate Court.'9 7
Third, the plaintiffs could have requested that the trial
court grant an injunction that merely ordered the defendants
to make the CAHSEE system constitutional, thus placing all
discretion in the defendants' hands, and sidestepping the
Appellate Court's concerns.
Even if the unthinkable
happened, and the defendants themselves came up with
delaying the diploma penalty as their solution, the Appellate
Court would have been unlikely to intervene to assert its
interpretation that access to a diploma is not included in the
fundamental right to education, given the Appellate Court's
position regarding the discretion of the defendants to make
".

194. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 60850(e)(3); Geisinger Declaration, supra note 185,
at T 10, 19-24.
195. Welner, supra note 192, at 734.
196. Koski, supra note 192, at 307.
197. See O'Connell v. Super. Ct., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147, 169-70 (Ct. App. 2006).
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education policy choices. 9 8
Starting the litigation with any of these alternative
remedies as the initial target, however, would not have been
a good strategic choice for the Valenzuela plaintiffs, and may
present disadvantages for other exit exam opponents even
with the benefit of the Valenzuela opinions to consider. There
are general reasons why these remedies were inappropriate
Valenzuela starting targets. The only remedy adequate to
effectively protect these plaintiffs' rights was to enjoin the
diploma penalty immediately.
That is the remedy the
plaintiffs sought and that is the remedy we were retained to
pursue.
The plaintiffs wanted to walk the stage for
graduation and obtain their diplomas at the end of the
twelfth grade. One named plaintiff, for example, had already
been admitted to a four-year university.
Remedies focused on further educational opportunities,
or fundamentally improving the preparation of students to
pass the exam, might be adequate for later classes, but would
have taken effect too slowly for the Class of 2006.
Additionally, it was good strategy in Valenzuela, where there
was extensive existing evidence that students in the Class of
2006 were not being given an equal or adequate opportunity
to learn the materials on the test, to try to leverage the strong
protection that California traditionally gives students' rights.
The hesitation by the Appellate Court to protect students'
rights was not a foregone conclusion for the plaintiffs as,
candidly, a differently-composed appellate panel could easily
have affirmed the trial court's judgment. Parties in states
with less legal protection-almost all-may choose to adjust
their strategic choices,199 although plaintiffs have successfully
secured students' diplomas in these states as well.20 0
There are also specific reasons for not choosing each of
these three remedies as an initial goal. Seeking further
remedial opportunities after the twelfth grade could not

198. See id. at 170-71.
199. For example, in Massachusetts, a state where the exit exam has been
under attack, plaintiffs will find their state constitutional challenges reviewed
under the rational basis test, as education is not a fundamental right under the
Massachusetts Constitution. See Baron, supra note 18, at 139-140, 144-47.
200. For instance, the Debra P. plaintiffs were successful even though the
court used a rational basis test. See Debra P. v. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244,
263, 268-69 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
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prevent the imminent constitutional harm to students of
being denied their diplomas without an adequate or equal
opportunity to learn the material. Furthermore, it would
delay students being able to take the next steps in their lives,
whether to employment or more education.
For many
students this would be a real hardship.
Pursuing the enforcement of an opportunity to learn
standard through an injunction requiring alignment of
curriculum, instruction and tested material is a promising
approach to improving educational equity and opportunity
vis-h-vis an exit exam requirement. However, it envisions a
different lawsuit with different plaintiffs than Valenzuela. In
order to protect students' rights, this approach would need
plaintiffs whose constitutional injury of diploma denial was
not imminent. This itself might raise ripeness issues. And
the remedy, once secured, might be tricky to monitor and
burdensome to enforce, although if it were tied to measures of
particular educational inputs (for example, percentage of
certified teachers), it could be workable and have real value.
Targeting a remedy that gives total discretion to the
defendants to devise a constitutional fix is rife with dangers.
First, given the defendants' record over the last eight years of
implementing the CAHSEE with such little and belated effort
to promote student performance or ensure equitable
opportunity, it is likely the defendants would delay coming up
with a solution, and that the ultimate solution would be halfhearted. This is, in fact, evidenced by the Valenzuela record
in which the defendants suggested the proper remedy was
simply to allow the Williams reforms to take their course,
even though there was substantial evidence that it will take
years for these reforms to be fully implemented. 20 1 But the
only way the Valenzuela plaintiffs could avoid constitutional
injury was through an immediately effective solution.
Second, given the defendants' demonstrated unwillingness to
pressure, or support, districts in their manners of
implementing the CAHSEE, it is likely a defendant-designed
solution would avoid making districts take specific measures
to improve, even though it is at the district and school level
that meaningful opportunities to -3arnthe test material must

at

201. See Traverse, supra note 160, at 11; Londen Declaration, supra note 52,
25; Allen, supra note 54.
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increase.
And third, given the defendants' articulated,
narrow focus on the CAHSEE as a tool for creating student
accountability, with little to no acknowledgement of the need
for the CAHSEE to require accountability from school
districts, schools, teachers and the State, it is likely their
remedy would have continued to place the main burden of the
State's failure to provide equal and adequate preparation on
the students themselves.
B. FilingEarlier
One strategic change might have been to file the
complaint and move for the preliminary injunction earlier. In
Valenzuela, the plaintiffs informed the defendants of their
belief that students' rights were being violated, and made
good faith efforts to encourage the defendants to rectify the
problem. This pre-litigation effort lasted about four months
leading up to the February 2006 filing. If the plaintiffs had
filed instead in the fall of 2005, or even in the spring of 2005,
perhaps the Appellate Court would have modified the
injunction instead of vacating it, for example, such that the
defendants must demonstrate constitutionality before the
spring of 2006 or the injunction would issue. This would have
been an unlikely step by the Appellate Court given its
interpretation of the right to education, but allowing for such
a modified injunction might have mitigated some separation
of powers concerns. This approach would have created other
problems, though, including potential ripeness issues. It
additionally would have limited the facts the plaintiffs could
have presented specific to the Class of 2006's performance
and how many students were likely to be affected by the
diploma penalty's introduction.
C. Moving for a More Tailored Injunction by Limiting Class
of Plaintiffs
Another possibility would have been to move for an
injunction against the diploma penalty for a more tailored
class than all students in the Class of 2006 who had
completed their graduation requirements except for passing
the CAHSEE. For example, the plaintiffs could have been
limited to only those students at schools where they were not
given an equal or adequate opportunity to learn the material.
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This might have lessened, if not eliminated, the Appellate
Court's separation of powers concerns as it would narrow the
injunction's scope, although it still would not provide the
defendants discretion to devise their own solution.2 °2 This
approach would not, however, have avoided the Appellate
Court's judgment that the right to education only includes
educational opportunities, not receipt of a diploma.
Furthermore, it would have created additional complex
evidentiary challenges. The plaintiffs would have needed to
supply a way of demonstrating which schools were not
providing an equal or adequate opportunity to learn the
material. Since there are hundreds of school districts in
California, this would have been a difficult and timeconsuming proposition, even though the plaintiffs likely could
have developed an effective proxy with the help of their
experts. Judge Freedman seemed to contemplate such a
proxy when he noted, acknowledging that some students who
were uninjured might benefit from the injunction, that "no
suggestion.., of a workable mechanism" had been offered for
tracing causation of students' not passing the CAHSEE to
State failures.2 °3 If the plaintiffs had developed such a proxy,
it assuredly would have been hotly contested, and, despite
Judge Freedman's aside, the court might have been hesitant
to rely on it to make distinctions between students given the
critical value of the remedy.
D. Current State of Case After Successful Settlement
Negotiations
The parties started settlement discussions directly after
the Appellate Court vacated the injunction. Following about
seven months of vigorous negotiations, the parties agreed on
final draft settlement legislation, which was then introduced
to the Legislature. Negotiations continued in the following
months to develop the settlement agreement between the
parties.
The trial court granted final approval of the
settlement on August 13, 2007.204 As the Authors finalized
this Article, the settlement legislation had been passed by the
202. It also would have addressed the court's concern about a benefit being
provided to uninjured plaintiffs, an issue which is not addressed by this Article.
203. Order, supra note 127, at 13-14.
204. Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement, Valenzuela v. O'Connell,
JCCP-4468 (Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Alameda, Aug. 13, 2007).
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State Assembly and was under consideration by the State
Senate on an urgency basis.
The settlement legislation secures for the plaintiffs two
main benefits as well as some subsidiary benefits." 5 First,
students who have not passed the CAHSEE by the end of the
twelfth grade gain the right to two years of further
preparation for the CAHSEE provided free by their school
district. Second, if the student is an English Language
Learner, the district must provide two more years of English
proficiency development in order to prepare for the CAHSEE.
Additionally, notification about these new rights is required,
as is counseling regarding the options for students not
passing the CAHSEE by the end of the twelfth grade. The
new rights are included under California's Uniform
Complaint Process, so that students and families can seek
enforcement if their school district is deficient in providing
the additional instruction.
County Superintendents will
monitor and assess districts' implementation of the
remediation rights, like they do for the Williams reforms, as
part of the state's overall Academic Performance Index (API)
system.
The core of the settlement agreement is passage of the
settlement
legislation,
or legislation
that contains
substantially the same benefits. The settlement class has
been defined more expansively than the plaintiff class was
defined in the complaint. It includes past, present and future
students who do not pass the CAHSEE by the end of the
twelfth grade, instead of just students in the Class of 2006.
In exchange for the benefits detailed above, the entire
settlement class will release its claims related to options for
continuing to study for the CAHSEE after the twelfth grade.
Only settlement class members who were in the Class of
2006, however, released their broader constitutional and
statutory claims regarding other aspects of the CAHSEE
graduation requirement, such as the adequacy of in-school
preparation to pass the exam.
We believe that the settlement negotiated is a good result

205. See Assemb. B. 347 (Cal. 2007) (amending sections 35186, 37254, and
52378
of
the
California
Education
Code),
available
at
httpJ/info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_03010350/ab_347_bill 20070712_amended sen v92.pdf (as amended July 12, 2007).
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for the plaintiffs given the Appellate Court's decision. The
agreement was the result of wide-ranging discussions
exploring the extent of the defendants' willingness to make
changes to CAHSEE policies and to provide meaningful
additional services to plaintiff students.
It provides a
significant new benefit which should facilitate the ultimate, if
delayed, graduation of many students. Grassroots monitoring
of the districts' implementation, continued funding and
widespread encouragement of students to access the new
remediation will be essential to the meaningfulness of these
new rights.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The rulings in Valenzuela suggest that future class action
challenges to the California exit exam graduation
requirement seeking the remedy of allowing students to
graduate will meet a cold reception given the current
composition of the California Supreme Court. Nonetheless,
the Valenzuela opinion shows that California courts recognize
how the State jeopardizes students' equal protection and
fundamental right to education guarantees by unequally
preparing students for the exit exam.
Californians can rightly be proud that their Constitution
has historically provided strong protection for education
rights. Students, families, and any other groups interested in
promoting equality and opportunity for California students
should creatively explore how to hold the state, school
districts and schools-and other citizens-responsible for
living up to this constitutional protection vis-a-vis the new
exit exam system. The attention generated by the Valenzuela
lawsuit and other public criticism of the CAHSEE system has
already had a positive effect. Since the commencement of the
suit, the State increased the amount of funding provided for
CAHSEE remediation, first allocated in 2005, from twenty
million dollars to seventy million dollars, and also made it
available for remediation for students who had completed the
twelfth grade. The Legislature created a substantial new
funding stream for middle school and high school counseling,
and included CAHSEE counseling in the funding conditions.
As part of the Valenzuela settlement negotiations, the
defendants agreed to survey districts to assess the
availability of remediation for students who had not passed
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by the end of the twelfth grade. Additionally, the SPI agreed
to reach out, twice, to school districts to encourage them to
invite students in the Class of 2006 back for further
remediation.
Given the State's track record of inaction on the state
level until 2005, these positive developments should hearten
California citizens who want to instigate further reforms of
the CAHSEE system by continuing to publicly scrutinize and
challenge the implementation of the exam. Such citizens, and
similarly-concerned citizens of other states, should, however,
consider this lesson from Valenzuela: While the Appellate
Court's opinion focused heavily on the danger of the judicial
branch encroaching on the political branches' authority, the
Valenzuela story is potentially instructive about the influence
of politics on the judiciary. The California Supreme Court
voted only four to three to stay the diploma penalty
injunction, and the fourth vote was from a justice appointed
by the new governor, Arnold Schwarzenegger, who was
elected after a recall of the former governor. The exit exam is
supported by powerful and ambitious political players, such
as SPI O'Connell, and, whatever the actual merits of the
separation of powers concerns, the Appellate Court's
affirmation of the injunction might have been perceived as a
slap at the political branches. While political influence on
legal decisions is difficult to assess, it is critical that
advocates for equal opportunity take this factor into
account-and try to address it politically as well as legallywhen planning their long- and short-term strategies for
challenging troubling governmental policies.
As exit exams have spread, citizens in many states
besides California have become fiercely interested in how well
their states are implementing the exams and preparing
students to pass them. We look forward to seeing how
students in those states are able to contest and improve their
exit exam systems, and how courts elsewhere approach the
issue of remedies, which became so central in Valenzuela.
The Valenzuela case is likely approaching its conclusion,
but the challenges that California will face as a result of its
exit exam policy have just begun. Tens of thousands of
students continue to not pass the CAHSEE before the end of
the twelfth grade, and enter post-high school life without the
benefit of a high school diploma; at last count, the California
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Department of Education estimated that 34,000 students in
the Class of 2006 and 37,000 in the Class of 2007 had not yet
passed the exit exam. °6
The negative consequences for
students of not having diplomas are immediate and longterm: the lack of a diploma will slam the doors of opportunity,
despite the Appellate Court's insistence that the diploma
itself is of nominal importance. The negative consequences
for our state of welcoming into adulthood substantially more
citizens without diplomas will be far-reaching. The fact that
the majority of these citizens, who often admirably persisted
through difficult schools, are from communities already
burdened by poverty and lack of opportunity means the
damage will be even deeper.
California must accept the real consequences of its
decision to deny diplomas based on the results of a test
administered to students provided an unequal and
inadequate education, and must respond effectively. If-as
evidenced through this case-the State is unwilling to modify
its exit exam requirement, then it must genuinely commit to
fixing the systemic problems that allow tens of thousands of
students to make it through the twelfth grade without being
able to pass a tenth grade exam. The reforms introduced by
the Williams settlement will help rectify the deficiencies in
our public school system. These improvements, however,
must be buttressed and extended for the State to be able to
claim, in good conscience, that it is fairly denying diplomas to
students who are the products of the education system for
which it is ultimately responsible.
Otherwise, Liliana
Valenzuela, and other students like her who bore the initial
brunt of the State's cart-before-the horse approach to
education reform, will be followed by a continuous flood of
hard-working students who complete high school but do not
receive diplomas.

206. See News Release, California Department of Education, Superintendent
Jack O'Connell Announces Progress on High School Exit Exam for the Classes
of
2006
and
2007
(Apr.
16,
2007),
available
at
http://www.cde.ca.gov/nr/ne/yr07/yr07re154.asp.

